What drives disagreement about moral hypocrisy?
The research shows that judgments of hypocrisy are biased by social motivations, with people more likely to accuse enemies and defend allies based on how they perceive similarities in behaviour.
The challenge:
Calling someone a hypocrite has remained a common way to criticise them across time, culture and context. Hypocrites are seen as fickle and untrustworthy and allegations of hypocrisy can mean steep reputational costs. But people disagree over who is and is not a hypocrite – few believe themselves or their friends to be such, and pointing out ethical inconsistencies in others often fails to change their beliefs or behaviour. But why is this? In this paper we argue that one reason hypocrisy charges may fail to land is due to differing perceptions of comparability and the extent to which someone’s beliefs or behaviours seem inconsistent across different instances.
The research shows that judgments of hypocrisy are biased by social motivations, with people more likely to accuse enemies and defend allies based on how they perceive similarities in behaviour.
The challenge:
Calling someone a hypocrite has remained a common way to criticise them across time, culture and context. Hypocrites are seen as fickle and untrustworthy and allegations of hypocrisy can mean steep reputational costs. But people disagree over who is and is not a hypocrite – few believe themselves or their friends to be such, and pointing out ethical inconsistencies in others often fails to change their beliefs or behaviour. But why is this? In this paper we argue that one reason hypocrisy charges may fail to land is due to differing perceptions of comparability and the extent to which someone’s beliefs or behaviours seem inconsistent across different instances.
The research:
Calling someone a hypocrite typically entails invoking a comparison; one meant to highlight internal contradiction and cast moral character into question – yet there is ambiguity about which sorts of comparisons are valid in the first place. Through three experiments, we conceptualised and tested the role of perceived comparability in evaluating hypocrisy. We explored the idea that when people are motivated to attack their enemies, they search for points of comparison in their enemies actions in order to identify inconsistence. Conversely, when they are motivated to defend their allies, they reject the notion that their allies actions are comparable, thereby evading hypocrisy judgments. In essence, people tend to adjust their standards of comparability according to whether they view the person in question favourably or unfavourably.
The impact:
Real-world morality is rife with complexity and no two situations are exactly alike. Our experiments identify an important role for perceived comparability in moral reasoning and help to explain why hypocrisy charges, despite their venom, might fail to make an impact. When motivated to attack, observers invoke comparisons to illustrate inconsistencies in a person’s beliefs or behaviour across different settings. Conversely, when motivated to defend, observers can delve into the details of scenarios and, because no two situations are perfectly alike, identify differences which justify believing that what might look like hypocrisy is really a case of apples and oranges – a fundamentally unreasonable comparison. This understanding can have broader implications for us in addressing conflicts and fostering more objective and fair assessments of moral behavior. The findings suggest that promoting awareness of perceived comparability and encouraging individuals to critically evaluate their biases could help mitigate disagreements about moral hypocrisy.
