Skip to main content

Please enter a keyword and click the arrow to search the site

Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions


Finance, Finance

Publishing details

Authors / Editors

Nyborg K G;Kremer I

Publication Year



In uniform auctions, buyers choose demand schedules as strategies and pay the same "market clearing" price for units awarded. The extant theory shows that these auctions are susceptible to arbitrarily large underpricing as a result of bidders having market power. This paper studies modifications to the theory of common value uniform price auctions which make it more realistic and are of empirical or normative interest. Underpricing is shown to be less severe than previously suggested and some empirical implications are developed.

Publication Research Centre

Institute of Finance and Accounting

Series Number

FIN 358


IFA Working Paper

Available on ECCH


Select up to 4 programmes to compare

Select one more to compare
subscribe_image_desktop 5949B9BFE33243D782D1C7A17E3345D0

Sign up to receive our latest news and business thinking direct to your inbox


Sign up to receive our latest course information and business thinking

Leave your details above if you would like to receive emails containing the latest thought leadership, invitations to events and news about courses that could enhance your career. If you would prefer not to receive our emails, you can still access the case study by clicking the button below. You can opt-out of receiving our emails at any time by visiting: or by unsubscribing through the link provided in our emails. View our Privacy Policy for more information on your rights.