The strategic under-reporting of bank risk
Journal
Review of Financial Studies
Subject
Finance
Publishing details
Authors / Editors
Begley T;Purnanandam A;Zheng K
Publication Year
2017
Abstract
We show that banks significantly under-report the risk in their trading book when they have lower equity capital. Specifically, a decrease in a bank’s equity capital results in substantially more violations of its self-reported risk levels in the following quarter. The under-reporting is especially high during the critical periods of high systemic risk and for banks with larger trading operations. We exploit a discontinuity in the expected benefit of under-reporting present in Basel regulations to provide further support for a causal link between capital-saving incentives and under-reporting. Overall, we show that banks’ self-reported risk measures become least informative precisely when they matter the most.
Keywords
Value-at-risk; risk-based capital requirements; risk measurement; systemic risk
Available on ECCH
No