Skip to main content

Please enter a keyword and click the arrow to search the site

Follow the money

Subject

Finance

Publishing details

Social Sciences Research Network

Authors / Editors

Grotteria M

Biographies

Publication Year

2018

Abstract

What is the connection among firm lobbying, risk and expected returns? I develop a game-theoretic asset pricing model in which firms lobby to gain or preserve monopolistic rents. The model has four key predictions. First, differences in expected returns are the equilibrium outcome of the strategic interaction among firms, and returns are higher for firms that lobby more. Second, firms that lobby more exhibit larger return volatility. Third, lobbying is less intense in more competitive industries. Fourth, and finally, firms in these industries tend to lobby in coalitions. Congressional data on lobbying spending support the model’s implications

Keywords

Lobbying; Expected returns; Imperfect competition; Strategic interaction

Series

Social Sciences Research Network

Available on ECCH

No


Select up to 4 programmes to compare

Select one more to compare
×
subscribe_image_desktop 5949B9BFE33243D782D1C7A17E3345D0

Sign up to receive our latest news and business thinking direct to your inbox