Feedback effects, asymmetric trading, and the limits to arbitrage
Journal
American Economic Review
Subject
Finance
Publishing details
Authors / Editors
Edmans A;Goldstein I;Jiang W
Biographies
Publication Year
2015
Abstract
This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises because firm value is endogenous to the exploitation of arbitrage. Trading on private information reveals this information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental value. While this feedback effect increases the profitability of a long position, it reduces the profitability of a short position. Thus, investors may refrain from trading on negative information, and so bad news is incorporated more slowly into prices than good news. This has potentially important real consequences -- if negative information is not incorporated into prices, inefficient projects are not canceled, leading to overinvestment.
Publication Notes
Limits to arbitrage; Feedback effect; Overinvestment
Available on ECCH
No
