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Divisible good auctions - the role of allocation rules

Subject

Finance

Publishing details

Authors / Editors

Kremer I;Nyborg K G

Publication Year

2003

Abstract

We examine the role of allocation rules in determining the set of equilibrium prices in uniform price auctions. Beginning with Wilson (1979), the theoretical literature has argued that these auctions are subject to possible low equilibrium prices. In this paper we show that this is due to the way the asset is being divided. We focus on allocation rules that specify the way the asset is divided in cases of excess demand. This may have a dramatic effect on the set of equilibrium prices. In particular, we show that the allocation rule used in practice has a negative effect on equilibrium prices.

Publication Research Centre

Institute of Finance and Accounting

Series Number

FIN 376

Series

IFA Working Paper

Available on ECCH

No


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