Skip to main content

Please enter a keyword and click the arrow to search the site

The Pandora's Box Problem with Sequential Inspections


Management Science and Operations

Publishing details

Social Sciences Research Network

Authors / Editors

Aouad A;Ji J;Shaposhnik Y


Publication Year



We study a generalized Pandora's box problem Weitzman (1979) in which boxes could be either (fully) opened for a certain fee to reveal their exact prizes, or partially opened at a reduced cost prior to being fully opened. This feature introduces a tradeoff where on one hand, partial opening provides a more accurate estimation of the box's prize without commitment to full opening, but on the other hand, overusing the option of partial opening may lead to excessive costs. We employ an array of techniques that were used to analyze related problems to provide a comprehensive analysis which includes (1) the identification of structural properties of the optimal policy that provide insights into what drives optimal opening decisions; (2) the derivation of provably near-optimal solutions to the stochastic and online problems; and (3) an extensive numerical study designed to examine the practical effectiveness of our policies. We find that while in general, characterizing the optimal policy is difficult, certain intuitive threshold-based policies that extend Pandora's box solution are extremely effective in solving our generalized problem.


Social Sciences Research Network

Available on ECCH


Select up to 4 programmes to compare

Select one more to compare
subscribe_image_desktop 5949B9BFE33243D782D1C7A17E3345D0

Sign up to receive our latest news and business thinking direct to your inbox