Regulation of compensation and systemic risk : evidence from the UK

Accounting

Social Sciences Research Network

Kleymenova A;Tuna I

Irem Tuna

2017

This paper studies the consequences of regulating executive compensation at financial institutions using the setting of the introduction of the UK Remuneration Code and the EU bonus cap regulation. Our analysis indicates that while the initial reaction to the Remuneration Code was positive, the stock market reacted negatively to the EU bonus cap regulation, suggesting that equity market investors perceive at least some costs from regulating executive compensation. In line with the intent of regulation, we also find that UK banks defer more bonuses and reduce risk. However, when compared to their US counterparts and other UK firms, UK banks also experience higher CEO turnover. Finally, we find that UK banks' compensation contracts become more complex after the regulation. Therefore, while regulation may have had the desired effect in terms of risk-taking, it may also have given rise to some unintended costs.

Executive compensation; Financial institutions; Regulation, EU bonus caps, UK Remuneration Code

Social Sciences Research Network

No

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