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Contractual incompleteness, limited liability and bubbles

Journal

Journal of Financial Economics

Subject

Finance

Publishing details

Journal of Financial Economics 2015 Vol 116:2 p 383-409

Authors / Editors

Dow J;Han J

Biographies

James Dow

Publication Year

2015

Abstract

When should we expect bubbles? Can levered intermediaries bid up risky asset prices through asset substitution? We study an economy with financial intermediaries that issue debt and equity to buy risky assets. Asset substitution alone cannot cause bubbles because it is priced into the intermediaries' securities. But incomplete contracts and managerial agency problems can make intermediaries take excessive risk to exploit limited liability, bidding up risky asset prices. This destroys welfare through misallocation of resources. We argue that incentives for private monitoring cannot solve this problem. Finally, even without agency problems, debt subsidies will create similar effects.

Keywords

leverage; limited liability; bubbles; contractual incompleteness; asset substitution; financial intermediation

Available on ECCH

No


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