BA (Yale) PhD (Stanford)
Paul Geroski Term Chair Professor of Economics
- Subject area:
Jean-Pierre Benoit can comment on issues pertaining to strategic behaviour, such as arise in, for instance, auctions.
‘Apparent Overconfidence’ (with J Dubra), Econometrica (Forthcoming); ‘Only a Dictatorship is Efficient’ (with L Kornhauser) Games and Economic Behavior, (2010); ‘Information Revelation in Auctions’ (with J Dubra), Games and Economic Behaviour (2006); ‘Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties are Permitted’, Journal of Economic Theory (2002); ‘ Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constraints’ (with V Krishna), Review of Economic Studies (2001); “Color-Blind is not Color-Neutral: Testing Differences and Affirmative Action” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 378-400, 1999. ‘Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games’ (with V Krishna), Econometrica (1993); ‘Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities’ (with V Krishna), Review of Economic Studies (1987).
Game theory, auctions, law and economics, voting, social organisations and industrial organisation.
Fulbright Senior Specialist.
Professor of Economics and Professor of Law, New York University.
tel: +44 (0)20 7000 8410
fax: +44 (0)20 7000 7001