Information acquisition and use by networked players
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
Subject
Economics
Publishing details
Authors / Editors
Myatt D P;Wallace C
Biographies
Publication Year
2019
Abstract
In an asymmetric coordination (or anti-coordination) game, players acquire and use signals about a payoff-relevant fundamental from multiple costly information sources. Some sources have greater clarity than others, and generate signals that are more correlated and so more public. Players wish to take actions close to the fundamental but also close to (or far away from) others’ actions. This paper studies how asymmetries in players’ coordination motives, represented as the weights that link players to neighbours on a network, affect how they use and acquire information. Relatively centrally located players (in the sense of Bonacich, when applied to the dependence of players’ payoffs upon the actions of others) acquire fewer signals from relatively clear information sources; they acquire less information in total; and they place more emphasis on relatively public signals.
Keywords
Networks; Bonacich centrality; Information acquisition and use; Public and private information
Available on ECCH
No
